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Executive Summary 
The purpose of this study is to provide an exploratory analysis of public 
resources’ allocation through online auctions. Online auctions are new ways of public 
resource allocation in China, but they are promising because of its broad participation 
and low transaction costs. In addition, compared to traditional administrative allocation 
mechanisms, auction methods could resolve the rent-seeking problem. One important 
point for an online auction is to design a certain set of rules to attract the targeted people 
to realize the rule-maker’s goal. But why can a certain set of rules affect the 
participants’ actions? To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze the essence of 
human nature, because actions are instructed by ideas, while ideals are determined by 
human nature.  
What is the essential characteristic of men? It is greed. Once a man comes to the 
world, he wants to maintain his life, and then greed appears. In addition, human nature 
is alterable. Therefore, participants’ actions instructed by ideas are alterable. This is the 
meaning of designing different auction rules. Moreover, different rules of auctions are 
determined by different auction goals. Because public resources are natural monopoly, 
specialty assets shared by the public and have long time usage, the government should 
design a mechanism to find the maximum value of the resources and to allocate them to 
the bidder who has the biggest probability to realize his or her value. Here the 
maximum value of resources involves not only efficiency, but also equity due to its 
“public” characteristic. Open ascending auction is relatively a good method of 
allocation because it provides bidders with more information, in terms of efficiency 
and equity. 
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In conclusion, since public resources are owned by the citizens, its allocation 
should help the public to make a profit. But nowadays, many government agencies 
have sold public resources to make their own profits by sacrificing the public’s 
interests. These actions have the tendency of making governments to deviate from 
their missions. To ensure that the general public will earn some profits, when 
designing auction rules, three questions must be answered: what is the goal of the 
auction? What rules should be designed to realize the goal? Who is to empower the 
auctioneer to auction? Only after these questions are clearly answered, can any 
auction by a public entity be successful. 
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An Exploratory Analysis of Public Resource Online Auctions 
 
1 Introduction 
Huge changes have occurred in every field during the thirty years of opening to the 
outside world in China. As an important way of resource allocation, online auctions are 
and will be more and more applied in the public resource distribution field of 
governments in China, such as treasury bills, radio spectrum licenses, mineral rights, 
special permission power of operation, distribution of important national scientific 
research funds, and so on. But the generalization and application of this method is 
restricted in a way because of the deficiency of both theoretical research and practice in 
China.  
In this field, one of the public policies, which are valued by the government and 
should be dealt with immediately in China, is how to design an optimal mechanism and 
formula of online auctions so as to allocate public resources in an open, transparent, and 
efficient way. But nowadays, the research on online auctions is seldom seen in China. 
At the same time, there are some new theoretical issues which need to be explained 
with the practice of online auctions in the specific circumstance in China. In fact, there 
are many studies on auction, but there are not any specific theoretical studies on online 
auctions. Therefore, it is a challenging topic both in theoretical and practical fields.  
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Vickrey’s Inaugural Contribution 
William Vickrey’s paper “Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed 
tenders” in 1961 is the first treatment of auction theory. In the paper, he used game 
theory to analyze the auction issues, and made enormous progress in putting forward 
  2 
some key issues in auction theory to induct the basic research methods in this theory. He 
analyzed simple auctions first in which there is a single unique indivisible object to be 
sold. By analysis, he demonstrated that whether the bidders are symmetrical or not, the 
dominant strategy for each bidder, in the ascending auctions, is to keep bidding until the 
current price equals to his value. At last, the bidder whose value is the highest wins the 
object at the price approximately equal to the second highest value. “This result is 
obviously Pareto-optimal” (Vickrey, 1961, 14). In the descending auctions, if the 
bidders are symmetrical, the price each bidder announces should be lower than his 
actual values. Finally, the bidder whose value is the highest will win. Thus, this result is 
also Pareto-optimal. But if the bidders are asymmetrical, the result of the descending 
auctions is likely to be inefficient.  
In addition, Vickrey (1961) also found that the descending auction is the same to 
the first-price sealed-bid auction in the strategies, because the situations the bidders 
consider in these two auctions are the same. What about the ascending auction? Vickrey 
(1961) proposed a kind of auction, the same to the ascending auction in strategies: the 
second-price sealed-bid auction, also called the Vickrey auction. An important 
characteristic of this auction is that the dominant strategy of each bidder is speaking out 
his actual value or “telling the truth.” Because the object is won by the bidder whose 
value is the highest, the result is Pareto-optimal. 
Another important contribution is that he proved that the average revenues in both 
the ascending auctions and the descending auctions are the same if the bidders are 
symmetrical.  Based on the former analysis that the descending auction is the same to 
the first-price sealed-bid auction in the strategies, and the ascending auction is the same 
to the second-price sealed-bid auction in the strategies, the result means that the average 
revenue the four kinds of auctions bring is equivalent. This is the 
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revenue equivalence theorem (RET). At the same time, Vickrey (1961) found that the 
revenue variance in the descending auctions is lower than in the ascending auctions. 
Thus, risk-aversion sellers prefer the former one. And he pointed out that collusion may 
be a fatal disadvantage in the sealed-bid auctions.  
In 1962, Vickrey extended his theory from single object auctions to multiunit 
auctions. He analyzed simultaneous auctions and sequential auctions in the case that 
each bidder could buy one unit at most. In fact, Vickrey’s 1961 and 1962 papers were 
the main factors in his 1996 Nobel Prize (Klemperer, 1999).  
2.2 The General Auction Theory 
2.2.1 The Four Standard Types of Auctions 
(1) The definition of the four standard types of auctions 
Usually, for simplicity, it is easier to consider the situation that only a single 
indivisible object is to be allocated. According to Vickrey’s opinion (1961), there are 
four basic types of auctions: the ascending-bid auction (also called the English auction), 
the descending-bid auction (also called the Dutch auction), the first-price sealed-bid 
auction, and the second-price sealed-bid auction. 
In the ascending-bid auction, the auctioneer announces a low price, and then the 
bidders do not stop to announce their prices in a progressive way until only one bidder 
remains, and that bidder wins the object at the final price. In the descending-bid auction, 
in which the process is opposite to the ascending-bid auction, the auctioneer announces 
a very high price, and then he does not stop to announce prices in descending sequence 
until someone calls out that he or she will accept the current price. And that first bidder 
wins the object at that price. In the first-price sealed-bid auction, every bidder submits 
his or her own price without knowing others’ bids, and the bidder who gives the highest 
price wins the object at that price.  
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In the second-price sealed-bid auction, the same process as the first-price 
sealed-bid auction, every bidder submits his or her own price without knowing others’ 
bids, and the bidder who gives the highest price wins the object. But in this auction, the 
winner pays the object at the second-highest bidder’s price, not the highest price he 
gives. That is to say, in the first-price sealed-bid auction, the price the winner pays is the 
highest price or “first” price, but in the second-price sealed-bid auction, the price the 
winner pays is the second-highest bidder’s price or “second price.” 
All the four types of auctions have the same hypothesis that the auctioneer and the 
bidder are rational economic men and selfish. This is a theoretical assumption, however, 
which may not be compatible with the reality. Idea affects behavior. And human nature 
affects the auction behavior. The paper will analyze this issue in detail in the following 
section. At present, one point to mention is that human nature is greedy originally and 
changes according to different situations (Fangfu, 2007).  
(2) The ascending-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction 
In the ascending-bid auctions, during the bidding process, it is beneficial for the 
bidder to stay in the bidding until the price reaches his or her value (Milgrom and Weber, 
1982). For example, if one bidder thinks that the object is worth x dollars, and now 
another bidder’s price is less than x dollars, it is beneficial for him or her to announce a 
higher price than that bidder’s price. However, if another bidder’s price is more than x 
dollars, it is good for him or her to stop bidding. So in this kind of auction, the dominant 
strategy for a bidder is that he or she does not stop bidding until the current price equals 
his actual value. Thus, the bidder who has the highest value will win the object.  
For the price, when the bidder who has the highest value announces the price equal 
to the value of the second-highest bidder, all the bidders stop to bid again, or they will 
have a loss, because the price is more than their value. So here, the bidder with the 
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highest value will win the object at the price equal to the value of the second-highest 
bidder. 
In the second-price sealed-bid auctions, the result is the same as the ascending 
auction. Similarly, if a bidder thinks the object is worth x dollars, while other bidders’ 
highest value is y dollars, and if that bidder submitted his price z, which is lower than 
the actual value x dollars, now there are three possibilities: (1) if x is lower than y, there 
is no difference to submit z or x; (2) if x is higher than y, and his price is higher than y, 
he will win the object at the price y, the same result as submitting x; (3) if x is higher 
than y, but his price is lower than y, then he will lose the chance to win. In the opposite 
situation that the bidder submitted his price higher than the actual value, it is the same 
way to verify the result is the same. Generally speaking, it is the best way to submit the 
actual value (Tan, 2001, 7-8).  
It can be clearly seen that in both the two kinds of auctions, the dominant strategy 
for the bidder is telling the actual value or “telling the truth,” and the winner will win 
the object at the price equal to the value of the second-highest bidder.  
(3) The descending-bid auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction 
In the descending-bid auction, if the current price is one bidder’s actual value, it is 
beneficial for him to accept it, or he may lose the chance to win. So the winner with the 
highest value will win the object at his value. 
As for the first-price sealed-bid auction, if the bidder does not tell the truth, the 
result is the same as the above analysis of the second-price sealed-bid auction. Thus, the 
dominant strategy is telling the truth, and the winner will get the object at his value 
(Vickrey, 1961; Milgrom and Weber, 1982). In a word, the results of these two kinds of 
auctions are the same. 
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2.2.2 The Basic Models of Auctions 
Based on different personal preferences and whether the information is perfect or 
not, there are three different basic models of auctions: the basic private-value model, 
the pure common-value model, and the general model (Klemperer, 1999). 
In the basic private-value model, each bidder has a special preference for the 
object, and his preference is not affected by others’ preferences. That is to say, each 
bidder’s price is a private price, and he gives the price just based on his own value. 
In the pure common-value model, each bidder has the same preference for the 
object, so the actual value is the same for everyone. But before knowing the actual 
value, each bidder has different private information about what that value actually is. 
Therefore, the bidder who has more information has bigger probability to win the object. 
And each bidder may change his estimate of the value if he knew another bidder’s 
information. In this kind of auction, a key feature of bidding is the winner’s curse. The 
winner may pay more than the object is worth when failing to differentiate the news 
being good or bad. So each bidder must know that he wins the object only when he has 
the highest signal. 
These two models are two extremes. Reality encompasses both these two 
occasions that each bidder has their own preference and information, so they have their 
personal value, but at the same time, each bidder’s value depends on others’ 
information because this affects the resale value and the prestige of owning it. This 
situation is the general model. 
2.2.3 Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET) 
The analysis of the auction revenue usually starts with the benchmark model 
containing the following assumptions: (1) there is a single object to be sold; (2) all the 
buyers are risk-neutral; (3) all the buyers are symmetrical; (4) each buyer has 
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independent private information, and he would not change his value even knowing 
others’ signals; (5) the relationship among the buyers is non-cooperative games 
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982). 
As demonstrated before, Vickrey showed that the expected revenue of all the 
standard auctions, the ascending auctions, the descending auctions, the first-price 
sealed-bid auctions, and the second-price sealed-bid auction is the same, which is called 
revenue equivalence theorem (RET). Thus, whatever auction the seller chooses is not 
important. 
Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) proved that the equivalence of 
expected revenue in the standard auctions could be generalized to other situations. For 
example, if combining the first-price auctions and the second-price auctions and 
assuming the bidder who gives the highest price wins at the price equal to half of the 
highest price plus half of the second-highest price, the average revenue is the same as in 
the standard auctions. 
2.2.4 Relaxing Some Assumptions of the Benchmark Model 
(1) Risk aversion 
The RET above is based on the assumption that the bidders are risk-neutral. 
But if the bidders are risk-averse, what is the result? Then, in the second-price 
auctions or the ascending auctions, the dominant strategy for the bidders is still telling 
the truth. But in the first-price auctions, a slightly higher price increases his probability 
to win, at the cost of slightly reducing the value. So in this situation, the bidder may bid 
aggressively to make sure he is wining and get the benefits, which could increase the 
seller’s revenues. Therefore, the seller prefers the first-price auctions to the 
second-price auctions when facing risk-averse bidders. And the RET does not exist 
either (Klemperer, 1999). But the difficulty is how to differentiate the bidders that are 
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risk-neutral or risk-averse. 
(2) Affiliated value 
In this situation, each bidder has their own preference and information, so they 
have their personal value, but at the same time, each bidder’s value depends on others’ 
information. In the ascending auction, the process is open, which can give a signal to 
others that means the winner’s curse could be avoided strongly, and the bidders have 
greater incentive to bid. So if there is affiliated value, the ascending auction has a 
revenue advantage (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).  
(3) Asymmetries 
Myerson (1981) verified that the optimal choice for the seller is to sell the object to 
the bidder whose marginal revenue is the highest rather than the bidder whose private 
value is the highest. And the seller even sets different reserve prices for the bidders. For 
example, in China, when the government decides to sell an object, and the bidders 
include domestic companies and foreign companies, foreign companies are 
comparatively effective because they have lower technical cost. Therefore, the 
government may give some special policies to domestic companies to improve their 
competition ability. 
And if the buyers are asymmetrical, which kind of auction is beneficial to the 
seller? If each bidder’s price is a personal price, and will not be affected by others’ price, 
in the ascending auctions and the second-price sealed-bid auctions, the dominant 
strategy for the bidder is still to tell the truth. In the first-price sealed-bid auctions, 
however, “the bidder whose value is drawn from a weaker distribution bids more 
aggressively than the bidder from a stronger distribution” (Klemperer, 1999, 236). Thus, 
for the seller, the first-price sealed-bid auction is better than the ascending auctions or 
the second-price sealed-bid auctions. But generally it is difficult to compare, and this is 
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still a task to be resolved. 
2.2.5 Collusion 
(1) Collusion among bidders 
If some of the bidders, even all the bidders, agree to set prices to reduce the 
competition, this is collusion. For example, all the bidders agree to give a low price and 
let one win the object, then after the auction or before the auction, all of them share the 
benefits.  
Robinson (1985) makes a point that a collusive agreement may be easier to sustain 
in an ascending auction than in a first-price auction. And this result gives an 
explanation why the first-price sealed-bid auction is popular. Assuming, all the bidders 
agree to designate one bidder to win, in the ascending auctions, the agreement is that all 
the other bidders do not set higher prices once the designated winner announces a price. 
And in this situation, no one would violate the agreement, because the designated 
winner could announce an even higher price to attack the violator. In the second-price 
auction, the agreement is that the designated winner will give an infinitely high price, 
but all the other bidders give the price equal to the seller’s reserve price. Under such 
conditions, similarly, nobody has an incentive to violate the agreement, because if 
anyone violates the agreement to give an even higher price than the designated winner’s 
price to win the object, he will pay the object at the designated winner’s price, which is 
infinitely high. Even though he wins the object, the price is so high that it exceeds his 
actual value and it is not worthy to violate the agreement. But if in the first-price auction, 
the designated winner could not give an infinitely high price, or he will win the object at 
that price. The rational choice for the agreement is that the designated winner gives a 
price just a little exceeding the seller’s reserve price, and the other bidders give the price 
equal to the seller’s reserve price. Here, in contrast to the second-price auction, 
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someone may violate the agreement, because he will win the object as long as he gives 
a price a little higher than the designated winner’ price, which is just a little exceeding 
the seller’s reserve price. That is to say, unlike the second-price auction, in which the 
price the winner has to pay is indefinitely high, here, the price is not very high 
(Robinson, 1985; Klemperer, 1999). 
Certainly, the seller could design some devices to reduce the opportunity of 
collusion: First, the seller should increase the reserve price; second, the seller should 
use a secret reserve price- that is, specify a reserve price in advance but not reveal it to 
the bidders until after the auction (Tan, 2001). If the highest price does not exceed the 
reserve price, then the object will not be sold. But an important problem is that it is 
difficult to detect collusion.  
(2) Collusion between auctioneer and bidder 
Vickrey (1961) pointed out that if the seller is the government or a big organization, 
the auctioneer has no incentive to maintain the seller’s interests, especially in the 
sealed-bid auctions. For example, in the first-price sealed-bid auction, after all the bids 
were submitted, the auctioneer tells the highest-price bidder the second-highest price, 
and allows him to submit a new price a little higher than the second-highest price to get 
a bribe (Boehm and Olaya, 2006). 
(3) Collusion between auctioneer and seller 
In the second-price sealed-bid auction, a “shill” may be used to jack the price up 
(Vickrey, 1961). For example, after all bids are given, the auctioneer may tell the seller 
the top bid, and the seller submits a new bid just under the top bid by himself or asks his 
friend to do likewise to make the top bidder pay more. 
2.2.6 Multiunit Auctions 
(1) Same multiunit auctions 
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In the same multiunit auctions, there are k same objects with n buyers, and n > k. 
And it usually supposes that each buyer only needs to buy one object. There are two 
ways to auction those same objects: simultaneous auction, in which all the objects are 
auctioned at the same time, and sequential auction, in which the object is auctioned one 
by one (Vickrey, 1961, 24). 
For the simultaneous auction, there are often two ways to determine the winner’s 
price: discriminatory price, in which each bidder submits a bid independently, and k 
highest-price buyers win at their own price, and uniform price, in which k highest-price 
buyers win, but the price is equal to the (k+1) highest-price (Vickrey, 1961). 
In the symmetrical independent private value model, if the bidders are risk neutral, 
the RET can be applied to the discriminatory price and uniform price models. RET also 
can be applied to the sequential auctions. In the symmetrical independent private value 
model, if the bidders are risk neutral, each object’s expected price is the same, not 
affected by the sequence (Tan, 2001). But in the common value model, the expected 
prices are different, because the annunciation of the former price provides information 
to the following auctions (Milgrom and Weber, 1982).    
(2) Different multiunit auctions 
About this issue, the research has not been mature until now. And it needs to be 
studied further. 
2.3 The Auction Online Theories 
2.3.1 The Choice of Auction Formats 
In the benchmark model, the expected revenue is the same in the four standard 
auction formats, and the seller could choose any one of them. But in reality, the 
assumptions in the benchmark model cannot be satisfied completely. Therefore, the 
expected revenues in the four auction formats are different. 
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Lucking-Reiley (1999) did a spot experiment to the RET. By the experiment, the 
result is that the average revenue in the descending auction is 30 percent higher than in 
the first-price sealed-bid auction site. But the average revenue in the ascending auction 
is almost the same as in the second-price sealed-bid auction (Lucking-Reiley, 1999, 
1078). How to explain the result? One explanation is that the spot experiment cannot 
control the entry of bidders. In this experiment, the number of the bidders in the 
descending auction is nearly twice as many as in the first-price sealed-bid auction, so 
the increase of the bidders could result in the increase of the seller’s revenue.  
In reality, when a person observes the main three online auction sites eBay, Yahoo 
and Amazon, he could find that all three adopt the ascending auction. And 
Lucking-Reiley (2000, 237) found that of the 142 sites, 121 used the ascending auction, 
21 used the sealed-bid auction, and 3 used the descending auction. Six of the sites used 
more than one auction format, which is the reason why the sum is more than 142. Why 
is the ascending auction so popular in the online auctions? According to 
Lucking-Reiley’s explanation, when the people first hear the word “auction,” they think 
it is ascending auction. Therefore, ascending auction is prevalent now. The second 
reason is because most of the online auctions belong to the common model. And for the 
common model, the result given by Milgrom and Weber (1982) is that the expected 
revenue in the ascending auction is higher than in other auction formats, because in the 
ascending auction, the bidders do not worry about the winner’s curse issue, and they 
will not conceal their bid. But it does not mean that the surplus the bidder gets in the 
ascending auction is lower than in the other auction formats. Therefore, adopting 
ascending auction is beneficial for the three participators: the seller gets higher 
revenues, the buyer could avoid the winner’s curse issue, and the auction site could get 
higher fees. 
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2.3.2 The Reserve Price of the Seller 
Many eBay sellers, especially those selling high-value objects, often set secret 
reserve prices. When will the seller use a secret reserve price? Bajari and Hortacsu 
(2003) found that sellers tend to use the secret reserve price when the objects are 
high-value. 
Vincent (1995) showed that setting a secret reserve price can increase the seller’s 
revenue in a common value auction. But Katkar and Reiley (2002) thought that some 
sellers adopt secret reserve prices for other reasons not increasing their expected 
auction prices: by making a high secret reserve price, the sellers could find out the 
highest-price bidder, and then they could make a transaction beyond the auction site to 
save the auctioneer fees. By contrast, through a field experiment, they found that using 
secret reserve prices may discourage serious bidders from entering the bidding, and 
reduce the sale probability and decrease the sellers’ revenue. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) 
gave an additional cost using a secret reserve price: for some bidders, especially those 
participating in an auction for the first time, they do not understand the auction online 
rules, and if they do not win the object because of the secret reserve price, they will be 
angry with the result. Then they may give negative comments to the seller in the 
comment column. 
2.3.3 Bidding Strategies  
One of the strategies the bidders usually use is “sniping,” or “waiting until the final 
minute of the auction to submit a bid” (Lucking-Reiley, 2000, 238). Ockenfels and 
Roth (2002, 1099) found that of 240 antique-auctions, there were 89 auctions in which 
the bidders submitted bids in the final one minute, and there were 29 auctions in which 
the bidders submitted bids in the final 10 seconds.  
The first explanation is that there are some experience-inadequate bidders or some 
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first-time auction bidders. They do not know the auction rules, and they increase their 
bid continually to compete with others. But for the rational bidders, the best way to 
compete with those bidders is to submit bids just before the auction ends. The second 
explanation is that giving an early bid may reveal information to the rivals if the auction 
closes at a fixed time, which serves no benefit to the bidder. 
The third explanation is based on the common value model. In the common value 
model auctions, the object has a real value, which cannot be observed directly by the 
bidders. But every bidder has their own private information. In the beginning of the 
auction, the bidders could renew his value according to others’ information. So to keep 
the information personal, the strategy is giving bids at the final minute. 
2.3.4 Fraud 
Except for having no opportunity to look over the object, another issue is the 
possibility of fraud. The first type of fraud is that the seller does not mail the goods or 
mails goods of lower quality than bid upon after the buyer pays. Usually the standard 
procedure for the buyer is to pay first, and then the seller mails the goods. But how does 
the buyer knows whether the seller mails the goods or not? (Snyder, 2000; Gavish and 
Tucci, 2006) Besides, the repeated transactions between the seller and the buyer are 
very few, lower than 20 percent during 5 months in eBay (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 
2002, 9). This limits the buyer’s from getting the information about the seller’s honesty 
and reliability. 
To resolve the problem, three mechanisms are used to discourage fraud. The first 
mechanism is that some auction sites encourage defrauded buyers to give complaints to 
the courts. The second mechanism is that eBay developed a feedback and rating system 
to encourage buyers and sellers to rate each other after a transaction. And it opens the 
results to the public. So every potential buyer could know the seller’s credit standing. 
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This is especially important for transactions involving expensive objects. If there is just 
a little feedback for the seller, the buyer is reluctant to buy an object with thousands of 
dollars. The third mechanism is that some auction sites encourage the buyers to use a 
third-party escrow service. The buyer sends money to an escrow agent first, and the 
agent verifies receipt to the seller. Then the seller mails the good. After the buyer gets 
the goods and confirms it meets his expectations, the agent gives the money to the seller 
(Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Snyder, 2000; Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002). But 
unfortunately, in some cases checked by Gavish and Tucci (2006), the escrow company 
did not exist at all, but was set up by the sellers. 
The second type of fraud is that sometimes the sellers use some strategies to drive 
up the price of the goods (Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Snyder, 2000). For example, during 
the process of the auction, the sellers themselves submit bids on their own goods or get 
their friends to bid on their behalf or even just invent a false identity with a new email 
address to bid on their own goods. These phenomena have been reported in traditional 
ascending auctions for many years. And most auctioneers do not allow the sellers to do 
so, but it is difficult to detect because the bidders cannot see each other. 
The third type of fraud, inversely, is that some buyers may use some strategies to 
reduce the price of the goods (Lucking-Reiley, 2000; Snyder, 2000). For example, at the 
beginning, one bidder makes a low bid, and then he asks his friend or just uses a false 
identity to make an infinitely high bid on the same object to keep others out of the 
auction. Finally, just at the final minute of the auction, the bidder retracts the high bid 
and leaves the low bid to win. 
 
3 Methodology 
In the existing literature, the research methods mainly include economics, game 
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theory, mathematics, and statistics. The literature made significant results. However, 
most of these results focus on designing specific auction rules and analyzing the 
behavioral strategies of bidders. Because of realistic circumstances’ diversity, such 
results are infinite theoretically, which may confuse people and could not resolve issues 
concerning public resources online auctions. 
Public resources are owned by the general public, so it involves public 
administration. At the same time, allocation of public resources involves efficiency and 
effectiveness, which is the main topic of economics. In this paper, the author tries to use 
a different research method, which is the setting-based research method, by integrating 
public administration, economics, and Chunghwa Taijics theory (the special study 
about Chinese traditional culture, ideas, and philosophies) based on the particularities 
of public resources.  
Chunghwa Taijics stated that all truths exist and all existences are setting-based, 
which means they exist in certain settings. At the same time, settings are changeable 
(Fangfu, 1996, 18). According to these ideas, the author puts forward a setting-based 
research method. The details are as follows: 
First, an issue should be clearly defined. Usually, people are fuzzy about definition 
of one issue. During the beginning phase of research, people should clearly know what 
the essence of an issue is, why the issue comes into being, what the settings of the issue 
are, and so on. Actually, in many situations, if one issue can be defined clearly, answers 
to the issue appear naturally. 
Second, certain standards should be established. Whatever definitions of issues or 
final solutions, there should be a clear judgment standard. For example, when people 
judge whether an auction is efficient or not, using different standards may lead to 
different conclusions. 
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Third, settings should be analyzed. About different issues, different resolutions, 
and different standards, what are the settings in which they are true? By analyzing the 
settings, people can state some principles to instruct practice. Then, in reality, people 
could apply these principles in a flexible way in different situations. 
The function of one theory or an analytical framework is to enlighten and open 
people’s minds, not to make them follow the theory or framework mechanically. 
Theories and practice are two different settings. 
In this paper, the author does not analyze the specific technical details and specific 
areas, such as designing auction rules for a specific object or mathematical analysis 
about bidders’ behavioral strategies in specific auction rules. The author tries to use an 
essence-finding research method to analyze the essence of public resources online 
auctions, to which government and the public pay most attention. In addition, except 
for general logic analytical methods, two case studies also are included in this paper. 
 
4 Findings  
4.1 Analysis of Auction Rules and Auction Participants’ behaviors 
An auction is to decide the price and the way of allocation of the object 
according to the participants’ value and a special set of rules. The most important 
thing in an auction is to design the auction rules (Chen, Chen and Song, 2005).  
The participants adopt different strategies according to different auction rules. 
But how could the auction rules affect the participants’ strategies? And then what is 
the essential factor of the auction rules? How does one decide whether a set of auction 
rules are good or not? What is the criterion? The answers to this fundamental question 
are seldom in the literature, and it is always considered a precondition. 
To answer the question, it is necessary to analyze human nature. Ideas affect 
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people’s behavior, while people’s basic ideas are determined by their human nature 
(Fangfu, 2007). 
Human nature means the essential character of people. People have many 
characteristics, and all the characteristics are alterable in different times and different 
places. But every change cannot deviate from the essential characteristic of men.  
Overall, in the western theory school, assumptions of human nature went through 
“economic man” to subsequent “social man,” “self-actualizing man,” and “complex 
man.” The “economic man,” also called rational economic man, means the purpose of 
all of the person’s behaviors is to maximize his personal interest, and he works only for 
money (MBAlibLink, 2009a). 
As for the “social man,” from 1927 to 1932, George Elton Mayo hosted the 
famous Hawthorne experiment. The results of the experiment revealed that except for 
the need of material benefits, men also have the need of communicating with others. All 
men are not independent, but are members of an organization. The relationship among 
the persons and the affiliation of the organization are even more important for 
motivating men’s behavior (MBAlibLink, 2009b). 
In the late 1950s, Abraham Maslow proposed the conception “self-actualizing 
man.” This hypothesis states that men are naturally lazy. And only when a man’s 
potential is encouraged and exerted fully can the man feel satisfied. The reason why 
men cannot be self-actualized is the limitation of the environment (Chen, 2008; 
MBAlibLink, 2009c). 
But the theoretical basis of “self-actualizing man” is wrong. Men are neither 
naturally lazy nor naturally diligent. In addition, the development of men is not a 
natural process.  
The meaning of the “complex man,” which was proposed by Schein in the late 
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1960s, includes two aspects: first, in terms of an individual, the private need and 
potential will change with growing age, increasing knowledge, shifting status, 
changing circumstances, and the relationship among persons; second, in terms of the 
person in a group, each man is different. Therefore, no matter whether the “economic 
man,” “social man” or “self-actualizing man,” each has its right side, but cannot apply 
to all men (MBAlibLink, 2009d). 
The basic limitation of these theories, from the material benefit pursuing of 
“economic man,” communication need of “social man,” relying on the environment of 
“self-actualizing man,” to the hypothesis of “complex man,” that the need of a man is 
alterable and every man is different, is that they just describe the behavior phenomenon 
of human nature under certain circumstances, but they do not analyze the reasons for 
the behavior phenomenon of human nature. For example, the hypothesis of “complex 
man,” just discusses the phenomenon that the need of a man is alterable, but it does not 
analyze why the need of a man is alterable. Phenomena change all the time and it is 
impossible to finish describing all the phenomena. To resolve this problem, the 
fundamental way is to analyze the essential character of human nature (Chen, 2008).  
Just as mentioned before, in this paper, the author thinks that greed is the 
essential and original character of human nature. All men cherish life. After coming 
into the world, man has life. Once alive, man will cherish his life, which is the nature of 
human being. In China, there is a proverb that “ants even treasure life, let alone men.” 
No one wants to give up his life naturally. Taking the infant as an example, once he has 
life, he wants to eat. If not, he will cry. And when the mother breastfeeds him, he sucks 
naturally without his parents’ instruction (Fangfu, 2007).  
The natural character of sustaining life leads to the first desire of humans. In 
Chinese traditional culture, the existence of one’s life is sustained by eating other lives, 
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because all the existence in the world, including the animals and plants, and even water, 
air, and so on, have life. In order to sustain life, the basic need is there being some food 
to eat. The need for eating, which is an inherent characteristic of men, becomes the first 
desire of men, and it is also the origin of men’s other desires. That is to say, as long as 
you are a person, you cannot be an exception.  
The key issue is that once the desire comes into being, it is impossible for the 
desire to be met completely. There is always a gap between the ideal need and the 
realistic supply of the desire. Once the desire appears, it is determined that the need of 
the desire is infinite. Even if one’s desire is met, another desire comes up. The desire at 
this time in this place is met, but a new desire comes up at a new time in a new place. It 
cannot be ended until the end of life. The theory of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs also 
demonstrates that another need will come up with one need being met (Fangfu, 2007). 
For example, to satisfy the need of eating, man must find some food. However, not 
all the food man wants can be received. In a poor family, when the child finds some 
food which looks very delicious while watching television and he has not eaten before, 
he wants to eat it very much. But his family is so poor that his parents cannot afford the 
food now. Thus his desire of getting the food comes up. On the one hand, if his desire is 
very strong but is not met all the time, he may develop behaviors that harm others; if so, 
evil comes into being. On the other hand, suppose his desire is met one day, but on the 
other day, when he sees someone eating some food he has not eaten before, he wants to 
eat again. So when an individual’s need is met, at a new environment, another need 
appears. The desire is infinite. If one’s desire cannot be satisfied completely forever, 
greed comes up.  
Greed, representing a willing that one man always wants more, was produced in 
the situation that the gap between demand and supply makes one’s need unable to be 
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satisfied. Just as analyzed before, the gap between demand and supply cannot be 
eliminated. Thus greed is a common characteristic of human beings. Greed is a strong 
desire in the mind, but not a behavior. Whether it can become an action depends on 
different circumstances. 
Idea leads to action. The action instructed by greed may cause harm to others 
under certain circumstances. Harm is an actual action caused by greed. And evil is a 
subjective assessment of harm. It is necessary to point out that the arising of harm need 
to meet some conditions, just as the taking root, sprouting, and growing up of one seed 
need soil moisture, air, sunlight and so on. If the conditions are not right, harmful 
behavior cannot come into being. Conversely, the behavior instructed by greed may 
change into good behavior. Pursuing personal interest can improve social welfare as a 
whole in a free market-based economic system, here the key problem being mechanism 
and conditions.  
Men hate and fear evil, so they call for considering public interest and advocate 
goodness. Goodness, which comes up as opposed to evil, is not the essential 
characteristic of human nature. It comes from evil. 
Whether harm, evil, goodness, or considering public interest, all these actions 
constitute human beings’ understanding and assessment of their behaviors. Thus, this 
understanding forms under certain circumstances in the society. The origin of bad 
behavior or good behavior is greed (Fangfu, 2007).  
In conclusion, the essential characteristic of the human nature is greed, while 
goodness comes from evil under certain circumstances. At the same time, human nature 
changes in different situations, and exhibits different characteristics. In addition, men 
have the ability to adapt to a new environment automatically. Just as the four auction 
mechanisms, the participants can take different strategies when facing different auction 
  22 
mechanisms. 
Human nature determines men’s ideas and instructs behaviors. Since human 
nature changes in different settings, the behaviors caused by human nature also change 
in different settings. Therefore, when it comes to the special case of auctions, the 
essence of auction rules is to create certain settings to attract potential participants to 
come to the settings. 
The auction rules must answer the following questions: Will the highest bidder 
win the object? If not, what conditions must the auction meet? Does every bidder know 
other bidders? How do you decide the price the winner should pay? Should every 
bidder pay a certain fee?  
There are not uniform criteria to judge an auction rule being good or bad. Here, the 
key issues are the angle of treating the issue and the auction purpose. That is to say, 
there are different situations: maybe if I view it from the management angle, it is good; 
but if I change to view it from the economic angle, it is not good. 
4.2 The Puzzle of Allocating the Right to Use Public Resource and the Auction 
System 
As an administrative object of government, “public resources” is a comprehensive 
concept including broad contents and complicated components, which mainly involves 
social resources, natural resources, and administrative resources. Social resources are 
the resources in the public utility field, such as the franchises of water supply, gas 
supply, telecommunication, and so on. Natural resources include land, mineral 
resources, water area, and so on. Administrative resources are the resources deriving 
from government carrying out the function of supplying public services, such as 
outdoor advertisements, bus lines, and so on. 
The main characteristics of public resources include they are owned by the whole 
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society; government can represent the public to have the right of disposal; services 
supplied by public resources can be shared by the public and managed because they are 
natural monopolies. Also, they are of long-term usage and are specialty assets, which 
means the funds put into the public resources cannot be used for other purposes.  
Because public resources are natural monopolies, most of the products of the 
natural monopolizing industries are pure or quasi-pure public goods, and the key inputs 
they use also have similar characteristics, such as telecommunication frequency, 
airports, hands-free telephone networks, and so on. In a way, the right to use the inputs 
is a prerequisite of monopolization. From the social benefit, it is important not only to 
regulate the products and prices of these industries, but also to interfere in the 
allocation of the rare resources.  
4.2.1 The Traditional Way of Allocating the Right for Public Resources 
(1) The externality of using the right of public resources and its allocation puzzle 
As demonstrated before, public resources are natural monopolies, while most of 
the products of the natural monopolizing industries are pure or quasi-pure public goods, 
and public goods are of externality, so the public resources have the characteristic of 
externality. How can the problem be resolved? Economists suggest privatization, 
nationalization, and governmental regulation to resolve overage or deficiency supply 
issues caused by the gap between private marginal costs and social marginal costs when 
using public goods, especially public goods with strong externality. In terms of 
privatization, it could completely resolve the externality brought by property right 
arrangements. But because of problems that arise from transaction costs, difficulties to 
define the property rights of the public resources, it could only be effectively used in the 
allocation of public resources which can be divided technically, whereas it is inefficient 
to allocate the resources, such as oceans, frequency, roads, and so on. In terms of 
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nationalization, it can partly reduce the transaction costs, but its limitations are notable. 
The first limitation is that the internal supervising costs may exceed the market 
transaction costs. The second limitation is that the efficiency of the team production 
descends with the increase of the layers of division of work, and the positive externality 
of public goods may enhance the free-rider effect. In terms of governmental regulation, 
the traditional way is achieved by taxation, licenses and quota, but license and quota 
may lead to vicious competition of getting rights and even lead to rent-seeking. In 
addition, taxation may cause the inefficiency of resource allocation. Though an auction 
is just a way of transaction, there must be a method for the reallocation of resources in 
the transaction process. If an auction involves fair and voluntary participation, the result 
satisfies the motivation compatibility. Therefore, it can realize improvement of social 
welfare by competitive auction. 
(2) Designing puzzle and implementing public resource regulation contract 
From the angle of mechanism design, the main ways of incentive regulation, such 
as high price limitation and sharing the profits, are some of the fundamental 
characteristics of economic contract, showing that the short-term or long-term relations 
between the regulators and the enterprises have been regulated through negotiations. 
Although they could improve the enterprises’ innovation and reduce costs, the defect is 
obvious. For example, the high price limitation may make the price deviate from the 
actual cost markedly, and then the total welfare will be reduced, especially in the cases 
that the varying range of the costs is big, or the enterprise could maintain its products in 
a low quantity without any penalty and the regulators have no way to avoid the 
enterprises getting much rent.  
In practice, most of the projects of incentive regulation are achieved by contract. 
But because of the existence of the regulator’s promise, asymmetry of information, 
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advancement of techniques, and other factors, which may cause moral hazard, adverse 
choices, and other issues, it is difficult to resolve these problems effectively either by 
short-term or long-term contracts. Nevertheless, the application of the auctions could 
show the real costs of the enterprises without considering the factors overall, which is 
important to ensure the realization of the public resources’ values. 
4.2.2 Auction and Rivalrousness Allocation of Public Resources 
With the relaxation of the regulation and the governments giving up the right to 
use some public resources, it is the main problem of the incentive regulation 
mechanism that shows how to improve the use efficiency of the public resources on the 
precondition that the necessary social needs are satisfied. Because of some 
characteristics, auction can be used in the public resource allocation system, and it has 
gradually become a main mechanism. 
There could be two auction mechanisms based on the characteristics of the public 
resources. The first one is the franchise bidding mechanism. Franchise bidding means 
that for the natural monopolizing industries, the government lets many enterprises 
compete for the exclusive right to serve, and according to some designed safeguards, 
lets the enterprise whose bid is the lowest supply the product or give the service. By 
adopting this approach, the fixed costs of the enterprise could be reduced by 
competition in the market entering phase. Since the bid is the least one, in the same 
market, the welfare received by consumers and government will be improved. For the 
enterprises, the project obtained by franchise bidding is always the area in which the 
fixed costs and the sunk-costs are very huge, such as water supply, seaports, airports, 
highways, and so on. The investment cannot be taken back in a short time. Therefore, 
they can be easily motivated to reduce many kinds of costs to realize maximum profit in 
the long run. It is obvious that there are some disadvantages for this mechanism: the 
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framework for the bidding still belongs to monopolization or oligarch monopolization. 
Thus, the enterprises have incentives to win over the regulators by rent seeking before 
bidding or collusion after submitting the bid; moreover, it is possible that the 
enterprises’ use is predatory and their special investment to the public resources is in 
deficit. 
The second mechanism is the direct bidding mechanism. It means that bidders 
report their own valuation directly, and then the seller decides the winner and the price 
according to certain auction rules. Direct auction could meet the incentive compatibility 
automatically, because the mechanism meets the requirement of the revelation principle, 
in which each bidder submits his private value to the subject independently, and 
according to the outcome, the seller decides the winner and the price.  
This modified auction mechanism realized the functions of the market transactions. 
First, it is of value revelation characteristics, which makes the value of the public 
resources achieved through competition; second, it makes the scarce resources gained 
by the bidder who has the highest value; and third, the participants of the auction must 
promise to supply services for all the people and not to resell. Only by promising these 
things, will they having bidding rights. Once obtaining the object, the responsibilities 
become the limitations to the enterprises. Therefore, a new contract of self-restriction 
and incentive compatibility could be produced by an auction. 
4.3 The Characteristics of Online Auctions and Mechanisms for Public Resource 
Online auctions are different from traditional auctions because they exhibit some 
new characteristics, and it is necessary to consider the characteristics when designing 
online auction mechanisms. Four important characteristics of the online auction are as 
follows (Chen, Chen and Song, 2005): 
First, the range of the participants is very broad. In traditional auctions, the bidders 
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are clear, both the seller and the bidder have a general knowledge about each other, and 
the information between the two is relative sufficient. But for the online auction, 
because it is based on the Internet, most of the auction sites do not give limitations to 
the bidders, except for a few auction sites adopting membership systems. Some auction 
sites only supply network platforms without knowing the information about the seller. 
Therefore, there are more uncertainties for the participants, both the sellers and the 
bidders, in the online auctions than in the traditional auctions.  
Second, the process of online auction is complicated. The traditional auction is a 
relatively closed system. Once the auction begins, the number of the bidders is certain. 
The online auction, however, is a relatively open system. After the bidding begins, the 
bidders may come to participate in the auction continuously during the period. Thus, in 
the online auction, the arriving process becomes a tool to show the number of bidders. 
Moreover, in the online auction, the bidders can choose proper bidding parameters, 
such as the amount of bidding and when to bid, which makes the auction process more 
complicated. 
Third, one must consider fraud, the biggest problem for online auctions, because 
supervision of the bidders and the sellers in the online auctions is not as easy as in 
traditional auctions. For example, because of the separation of the online auction 
process, regarding paying the bill and delivering the object, the transaction may not be 
successful even if the auction is a success. Whenever the bidder or the seller violates the 
contract, the transaction fails. In addition, just as mentioned in the literature review 
section; there are two additional kinds of fraud, the sellers using strategies to drive up 
the price of the object or the buyers using strategies to reduce the price of the object. 
Thus, when adopting online auctions, it is necessary to provide certain immunity 
against the possibility of fraud. 
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Fourth, in an online auction, products are abundant, and there are also many 
innovations. There are many kinds of products auctioned online. Nearly all products 
sold through fixed price in practice are available in online auctions. Some daily 
necessities are sold not only by online auctions but also by fixed price. In fact, a new 
challenge for online auctions is the sellers’ competition. At the same time, the 
development of the Internet techniques reduces the innovation cost of the online 
auction patterns, and this is the reason the online auction patterns are colorful. 
Because of the online auction’s characteristics of low transaction costs and broad 
participation, it is a relatively ideal and promising way for the competitive allocation 
of the public resources, which have the characteristic of ownership by the general 
public and the service supplied by them is also shared by the public. The fraud 
problem caused by the online auction could be avoided effectively because the 
government is the seller, and it will take proper administrative and lawful actions to 
avoid the fraud phenomenon. Online auctions, in effect, are advanced technical 
realization of public resources’ competitive allocation, and it is the realization of the 
traditional auction on the modern Internet. 
The optimal online auction mechanism should include the following factors: the 
optimal auction amount; the optimal bidders’ arrival rate, meaning the number of 
arriving persons in unit time such as every five minutes; and the optimal auction time. 
An online auction sometimes does not need to auction all the objects in one time 
period, but auction several times with certain objects each time. The optimal auction 
mechanism can also be expanded to multi-stages situations. Applying dynamic 
programming could resolve multi-stage decision-making issues, including working 
out the optimal auction time in every stage, the interval between two stages, and the 
optimal amount in every auction. 
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4.4 The Practice of Auction in China 
4.4.1 Cases about auctions in China 
Case 1:  Auctioning Cab License in Shenzhen, China 
In October 30, 2007, in Shenzhen, which lies in the coastal developed areas of 
China, new cab licenses were auctioned for the first time. The result was that 2,000 
licenses were divided by 20 enterprises equally, the price of each license was 542,500 
RMB, and the service life of each license was 12 years (NewsLink, 2009).  
In the beginning, there were 51 enterprises approved by the city traffic bureau. But 
11 enterprises did not pay margins on time. As a result, they were viewed as waivers of 
auction. Thus, there were 40 enterprises to auction 2,000 cab licenses at last. The rules 
of the auction included: each bidder only could get one object at most, that were 100 
cabs; all 20 objects were auctioned simultaneously; bids began from low to high; after 
every bid, the auctioneer counted the number of bidders showing their cards. Those 
who did not show their cards were viewed as auction waivers.  
At the live auction, the auctioneer announced the starting price, 150,000, which 
was a secret before the live auction. After nearly 80 times of showing cards, 20 of the 40 
enterprises won the objects at the price of 542,500 RMB per license (NewsLink, 2009).  
One enterprise that won the license expressed that it has an actual value of 
550,000. Therefore, it was satisfied with the result, and it still could get profits. At the 
same time, it pointed out that those blue-brand cars, illegal operating cabs, interfere 
with the regular operation of legal cabs. Thus, the government should crack down on 
those blue-brand cars seriously. In addition, three months later, after the new cabs were 
put on the market, the city traffic bureau is required to evaluate the market. If the new 
cabs have great impact on the market, it is possible to reduce the monthly fee of the 
cabs.  
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Case 2: Auctioning Stands in Lanzhou, China 
Two-year operation rights of 102 cold-drink and photography stands in a famous 
beauty spot were auctioned in April, 2007, in Lanzhou, which lies in western 
undeveloped areas in China. By auction, about 2,000,000 RMB were received. The 
public had different ideas about the auction: general citizens thought the behavior was 
inappropriate, new operators did not know whether they could make a profit or not, and 
old operators were angry with the action.  
The 29th stand was auctioned for 52,000 RMB, which was the highest price in this 
auction. Is it worthy for a stand made up of “3 tables, 2 umbrellas, 1 refrigerator” to be 
auctioned at so high a price? The old operator of the 29th stand said that during the last 
6 years, the highest annual income of the stand was about 11,000 RMB. If the cold 
drink price was not increased, the new operator paying 52,000 RMB would have a loss. 
Ms. Wang, who won the 30th stand at a price of 40,000 RMB, said clearly that she 
would give up the stand, because 40,000 RMB was too expensive to recover costs. In 
the past, there were two persons to operate every stand in two shifts. And there were 
nearly 160 persons, more than 90 percent of whom lost their jobs, to operate about 80 
stands (GansuNews, 2009). But now the auction made some old operators lose their 
stands. 
Small stands were auctioned at so high a price that it raised the public’s extensive 
attention. Mr. Xu, director of the beauty spot office, said that high price was the result of 
competition under a market-oriented economy. Mr. Wang, an old operator, expressed 
that it is unreasonable to squeeze out the old poor operators by auction. Mr. Li, the old 
operator of the 30th stand, thought that from the value deviation fact that a stand with 
only 10,000 RMB in income annually was auctioned 52,000 RMB, it could be clearly 
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seen as a way for the government to make profits from the public. Some other citizens 
also expressed they could not understand why the government auctioned the stands. 
Someone said that the auction, in fact, gave the poor people no way to survive. An 
expert said that some stands could not be sold through auction in the market at present, 
because the jobs provided for low-and-middle income earners are limited (GansuNews, 
2009).  
4.4.2 Case analysis 
Vickrey (1961) has demonstrated that the result of using an auction in which the 
price is to be determined by the first rejected bid is Pareto-optimal. This statement is 
based on sellers’ benefits. The “public” characteristic of public resources requires that 
they should be allocated openly, let every stakeholder know it, and make sure that 
everyone has the qualification to participate in the auction. Compared with 
administrative allocations, auctions can meet the “public” characteristic better. Case 1 
is a comparatively successful example of an auction. Compared with other cities, in 
which the governments still use the administrative way to allocate cab licenses, the 
auction increases the openness and transparence and reduces rent-seeking possibilities. 
Because of the rationality of the auction rules, in the whole process, behaviors of the 
bidders were nearly rational and the winners’ curse did not appear. Just as an enterprise 
expressed that its actual value was 550,000 RMB, it was satisfied with the auction result 
at the price of 542,500 RMB. Additionally, due to the characteristics of long-term usage 
and incremental values, in the case, the agency regulated the service life for 12 years. 
At the same time, the government will not give up the duty to regulate cab markets.  
But situations are different when standards and settings of defining and judging 
Pareto-optimal results change from sellers to buyers. The winners’ curse appeared in 
Case 2. Considering the benefits for the whole society, the auction was inefficient. A 
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government, as a ruler of public resources, is different from enterprises. It should 
represent and consider benefits for the general public. Maximum benefits of a seller 
cannot be the unique goal of public resource allocation. The purpose of a government, 
as the seller of public resources is not to pursue maximum income, but to optimize 
public resources’ allocation. This is an analysis of the efficiency of public resources 
allocation when using auction mechanisms, which is very deficient in recent auction 
literature. In fact, results of an auction are totally different when putting on different 
settings or facing different objects, based on different purposes. 
Public resources are owned by the general public. Thus, allocation of public 
resources should make the public get profit based on the principle of serving the public 
conveniently. About the standards of public resources allocation, two principles should 
be considered. The first one is equity. The second one is efficiency. According to the 
two principles, three questions should be answered before any auction of public 
resources: what is the goal of the auction? What rules should be designed? Who is to 
empower the auctioneer to auction?  
Case 2 did not answer the three questions well. First, the goal of the auction should 
not be to maximize the seller’s profits, but be a reasonable and efficient allocation of 
public resources. Compared with 200,000,000 RMB, the profits the government earned, 
it is more important to consider the problem of unemployment for about 160 persons. 
Maybe some of them or their families may sustain themselves by just relying on the 
stands. The result is inefficient, because they lost their sources of income after the 
auction. In addition, to keep the unique source of income, some stand operators cannot 
bid according to their actual values, which leads to the winner’s curse. Second, the 
auction was not empowered by the public or the legislative departments. It is decided 
by the government agency, which holds the public resources. In current systems in 
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China, the public’s interests have become some government sectors’ interests at last. 
About Case 2, if buyers’ interests were considered, different auction rules could be 
produced. For example, the government could auction the resources only to the 
unemployed persons to set entry conditions to buyers. If others want to enter, the 
government can consider setting new stands. Also, it can set the maximum price before 
the auction. As the seller, the government is in a monopoly position. Therefore, the 
auction rules should consider buyers’ interests more. But for some other public 
resources, such as the radio spectrum, land, mineral rights, and so on, the goal should be 
to maximize the sellers’ interests. Thus, the highest value of the object can be achieved. 
Moreover, for public resources auctions, it is necessary to differentiate settings in order 
to set different goals and rules. Then, it is possible for the result to be Pareto-optimal. 
In recent years, some local governments in China have not fulfilled their duties 
seriously, but have sold the paltry sundries by auctions, resulting in many disordered 
phenomena. For example, a local government sold a latrine at the price of 200,000 
RMB. Then 5 RMB was charged for one time, which equaled half-day incomes of the 
people whose resource incomes come from local social assistance payments (Jiangsu 
Provincial Office, 2009). This result was deviated from the tenet of public services. In 
addition, online auctions, as a way of low-cost and high-transparency auctions, have 
not been applied in public resource allocations. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The most important element of an auction is the formulation of auction rules. 
The essence of an auction rule is to create a setting to attract the targeted people, 
especially important potential bidders, to realize Pareto-optimal results of public 
resource allocation, and to make all the participants bid according to the person’s goal 
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who designs the rules. To understand this essence, it is necessary to know human 
nature. 
Once a person exists, he or she has the will to cherish life and maintain that life 
naturally. In order to survive, humans must obtain the substances necessary to 
maintain life, but this leads to greed. The greed is everlasting because of the infinity 
of the need. At the same time, human nature is alterable, which means people could 
adjust and change their behaviors to conform to their environment. These two points 
are the fundamental origin to explain people’s behaviors. Any specific behavior is a 
mutation in different settings driven by greed. 
The designing of the auction rules is to set up a special setting for all participants. 
Because of human’s alterability, setting up different rules is to inspire the bidders to 
take action instructed by their greed, being propitious to the person who sets up the 
rules. Therefore, different rules and different auction patterns are determined by 
different auction goals. 
Because of the characteristics of natural monopolies, specialty assets, long time 
usage, and divisibility of public resources, and the limited rationality and the 
insufficient motivation of government officials, the real controller, the biggest goal of 
auctions is to find the maximum value of the object and to allocate it to the bidder 
who has the greatest probability to realize its value. The “value” is the current value, 
which may increase with the passage of time, and the increase may also be based on 
relevant public inputs because of public resources long time usage. Therefore, the 
auction rule of public resources often forbids reselling, promises to supply public 
service, and regulates the service life. For example, the service life of a wireless 
spectrum is often about 15 years. Choosing open ascending auction could lead to the 
Pareto-optimal result of the public resource allocation, because it can provide bidders 
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more information and then increase efficiency, so it should be the basic auction 
mechanism. Based on this basic mechanism and according to different characteristics 
of public resources, certain specific auction mechanisms could be yielded. Online 
auctions are promising in public resource auction, because of their broad participation 
and low transaction costs. 
In addition, the rent-seeking problem broadly existing in the traditional public 
resource administrative allocation mechanisms can be resolved effectively in the 
auction mechanism. Unfortunately, this issue is not emphasized nor valued by some 
developing countries. The provision of three “third generation” (3G) mobile 
telecommunication licenses for free in January 2009 in China is a typical example. 
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